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THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW NOTION OF DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES – A REVIEW OF THE ICRC 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDE AND SUBSEQUENT DEBATE 
S Bosch 
1 Introduction 
The phrase "direct participation in hostilities"1 has a very exacting meaning in the 
realm of international humanitarian law (IHL), and refers generally to those activities 
normally undertaken by combatants.2 As a general rule, all those with combatant 
status are authorised to participate directly in hostilities and are immune from 
prosecution for their participation.3 Civilians, on the other hand, enjoy immunity 
against direct attack precisely because they refrain from any such direct participation 
in hostilities.4 As civilians, they remain protected from any direct targeting for so 
long as they refrain from participating in combative activities which would otherwise 
compromise their protected status.5  
Any civilian activity which amounts to direct participation in hostilities temporarily 
suspends civilians' inherent immunity against direct targeting, and exposes them to 
                                        
  Dr Shannon Bosch. BA (Hons) LLB (University of Natal) LLM (University of Cambridge) PhD 
(UKZN). Attorney of the High Court of South Africa; Senior Lecturer in Law (University of 
KwaZulu-Natal School of Law). E-mail: boschs@ukzn.ac.za. 
1  Some texts use the phrase interchangeably with "taking a direct part" or "taking an active part" 
in hostilities to refer to the same level of individual participation in hostilities (ICRC 2009 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-020609 43; 
Melzer Targeted Killings 335). 
2  Rogers 2004 YIHL 19. 
3  Provided they adhere to the limitations imposed upon them by IHL, regarding the methods and 
means of warfare (Ipsen "Combatants and Non-combatants" 65-67, 68; Regulations Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the Hague Convention IV 1910 UKTS 9 (Hague 
Regulations (HR)) art 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 1125 UNTS 1979 1391-441 
(Additional Protocol I (AP I)) art 43(2)). 
4  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 714-715. 
5  As the ICRC Commentary on AP I art 51(3) explains: "... the immunity afforded individual 
civilians is subject to an overriding condition, namely, on their abstaining from all hostile acts ... 
thus a civilian who takes part in an armed combat, either individually or as part of a group, 
thereby becomes a legitimate target, though only for as long as he takes part in hostilities" 
(Jensen "Direct Participation in Hostilities" 1995-2003). 
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direct targeting as a legitimate military target, and to prosecution for their 
unauthorised participation in hostilities.6 
This area has been the subject of much controversy, since:  
neither the Geneva Conventions nor their Additional Protocols provide a definition 
of what activities amount to "direct participation in hostilities".7 
This lacuna in the law is of particular concern in the light of the realities of 
contemporary international armed conflict, where non-state actors (often dressed as 
civilians) are playing an increasing role, states are outsourcing military functions to 
private contractors, and civilians are increasingly active as "farmers by day, fighters 
by night".8 There is a dire need for a consensus understanding of exactly what 
constitutes direct participation in hostilities, especially when considering to what 
extent such activities might be deemed unlawful.9 It is precisely this need that the 
International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) sought to address in the drafting 
of the Interpretive Guide, which this piece seeks to review. 
2  The treaty and customary international law notion of direct 
participation in hostilities  
2.1 "Direct participation" in treaty law 
Reference is made to the concept of direct participation in hostilities in many treaty 
provisions of IHL, including GC common article 3(1)10 and AP I article 51(3).11 In the 
commentary on AP I article 51 it is explained that: 
                                        
6  "Once he ceases to participate, the civilian regains his right to the protection under this section… 
and he may no longer be attacked" (Jensen "Direct Participation in Hostilities" 1995-2012); ICRC 
2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-020609 12; 
Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 703. 
7  Fenrick 2009 YIHL 292; ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-
participation-ihl-feature-020609 12. 
8  Jensen "Direct Participation in Hostilities" 2003-2012. 
9  Goodman and Jinks 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 637. 
10  "Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have 
laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any 
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction 
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria". 
11  "Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they 
take a direct part in hostilities". At the Diplomatic Conference leading to the adoption of the 
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… direct participation means acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely 
to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces.12 
The commentary goes on to differentiate "direct participation" from general "war 
effort", which is often simply expected of the whole population, and adopts a more 
cautious interpretation of the notion of direct participation in hostilities.13 The 
commentary limits its understanding of "direct participation in hostilities" to: 
… acts of war which are intended by their nature and purpose to hit specifically the 
personnel and matériel of the armed forces of the adverse Party.14 
While IHL treaty law makes reference to this concept, the treaty law does not offer a 
definition of the phrase or specify definitively when an individual's actions might be 
said to amount to direct participation in hostilities.15 
2.2 "Direct participation" in customary IHL 
At a national level, the principle that civilians lose their immunity against direct 
attack when they participate in hostilities is endorsed by several states' military 
manuals,16 and is also endorsed by reported state practice, official statements and 
judicial decisions,17 even by states that were not party to AP I.18 According to the 
ICRC's study of the customary international law status of this provision, there is no 
evidence of contrary state practice,19 and on the whole the principle (that civilians 
lose their immunity from prosecution when they participate in hostilities) was seen 
                                                                                                                          
Additional Protocols, Mexico stated that AP I art 51 was so essential that it "cannot be the 
subject of any reservations whatsoever since these would be inconsistent with the aim and 
purpose of Protocol I and undermine its basis", and in the end there were no reservations made 
to this provision when states signed up to AP I (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary 
International Humanitarian Law 23). 
12  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 711. 
13  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 711; Heaton 2005 A F L Rev 177. 
14  A "relatively direct nexus between that action and the resulting harm should exist; in other 
words, direct participation must be distinguishable from indirect participation" (Schmitt 2010 NYU 
J Int'l L & Pol 711). 
15  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 12; 41. 
16  Australia, Belgium, Ecuador, El Salvador, India, Netherlands, the United States and Yugoslavia 
(Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 22). 
17  Public Committee against Torture in Israel v Government of Israel 2006 HCJ 769/02 s37; Melzer 
Targeted Killings 337. 
18  Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 23. 
19  Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 23. 
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as a "valuable reaffirmation of an existing rule of customary international law".20 For 
the most part states work on the assumption that assessing whether an activity 
amounts to direct participation in hostilities or not has to be done on a "case-by-case 
basis"21 - although very few actually explain what activities amount to direct 
participation.22 
At a regional level, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights understands 
the term "direct participation in hostilities" to mean "acts which, by their nature or 
purpose, are intended to cause actual harm to enemy personnel and matériel".23 
As evidenced by the ICRC's study into customary international law, "a precise 
definition of the term direct participation in hostilities does not exist"24 in either state 
practice or international jurisprudence.25 What is clear, however, is that civilian "use 
of weapons or other means to commit acts of violence against human or material 
enemy forces",26 amounts to direct participation in hostilities. Short of this very 
obvious occurrence, states are having to interpret: 
 … the notion of direct participation in hostilities ... in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to its constituent terms in their context and in 
light of the object and purpose of IHL.27 
  
                                        
20  Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 23.  
21  Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 22. 
22  Some states' (Ecuador, United States and Philippines) military manuals cite "serving as guards, 
intelligence agents, or lookouts on behalf of military forces … spies or couriers" as amounting to 
direct participation in hostilities (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International 
Humanitarian Law 22). 
23  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Third Report on Human Rights in Colombia 
(Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 22). 
24  Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 22. 
25  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 41; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 23. 
26  Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 23. 
27  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 41. 
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3 The ICRC's Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation 
in Hostilities: an introduction  
3.1 The drafting process and the legal implications of the Guide 
Between 2003 and 2008, more than 40 legal experts (drawn from NGOs, academia 
and governmental bodies, including the military) came together on five occasions at 
the invitation of the ICRC.28 The resultant discussions informed the ICRC's 
Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under IHL.29 
Initially, the ICRC had sought a unanimous consensus at these expert meetings, but 
it soon became apparent (when some experts wanted to remove their names from 
the final report) that seeking unanimity might scuttle the whole project.30 In the end, 
the ICRC elected to omit all the names of the external experts, and instead had the 
Assembly of the ICRC adopt the final version of the guide on 26 February 2009.31  
The ICRC's Interpretive Guide was not intended to change the existing binding 
treaty and customary based rules of IHL, but rather to offer a comprehensive guide 
as to how to interpret the term legally - giving careful consideration to balancing 
both military necessity and humanitarian concerns.32 The 10 recommendations 
(supported by commentary) strove to:  
… reflect the ICRC's institutional position as to how existing IHL should be 
interpreted in light of the circumstances prevailing in contemporary armed 
conflicts.33 
As an interpretive guide the document is not legally binding - but coming from the 
ICRC (as the champion of IHL) the guide was intended to have persuasive 
                                        
28  Fenrick 2009 YIHL 288; Van der Toorn 2009 http://www.works.bepress.com 
/damien_van_der_toorn/1 22. 
29  The Interpretive Guide (ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-
participation-ihl-feature-020609 9) also draws on "the ICRC's institutional expertise … as a 
humanitarian organisation, having been operational for almost 150 years in countless armed 
conflicts all over the world" (Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 914). 
30  Roberts 2009 YIHL 41; Fenrick 2009 YIHL 288. 
31  Fenrick 2009 YIHL 288. 
32  The Interpretive Guide drew on the following sources of law: "customary IHL; treaty IHL 
(including the travaux préparatoires of treaties); international jurisprudence; military manuals 
and standard works of legal doctrine" (ICRC 2009 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-020609 9-10). 
33  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 9; Fenrick 2009 YIHL 288. 
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influence,34 and some suggest it "may even be viewed as a secondary source of 
international law ... analogous to writings of the most highly qualified publicists".35 
Until it becomes binding, or is acknowledged as having crystallised into customary 
IHL, Fenrick36 warns that it is not likely that legal advisors to government 
department will be inclined to adopt it wholesale, unless it can be shown that these 
recommendations are "well researched, well thought out, relevant and persuasive".  
3.2  The ICRC's Interpretive Guide's limitations and controversies 
The Interpretive Guide explicitly limits its analysis of the notion of direct participation 
in hostilities to decisions around military targeting. It does not purport to deal with 
issues of how direct participation impacts on questions around detention, or how this 
impacts on a combatant's claim to immunity from prosecution.37  
Once it is ascertained that an issue of direct participation has an impact on targeting 
decisions, the first enquiry that the Interpretive Guide directs is to whether or not 
the particular hostile act (often referred to as the specific hostile act) falls within the 
ambit of those restricted acts which amount to direct participation in hostilities.38 
Determining which specific activities amount to direct participation in hostilities is not 
dependent on one's "status, function, or affiliation",39 neither does it matter whether 
the act is carried out by civilians or members of the armed forces: 
 … on a spontaneous, sporadic, or unorganised basis; or as part of a continuous 
combat function assumed for an organised armed force or group belonging to a 
party to the conflict.40  
                                        
34  "A legally binding interpretation of IHL can only be formulated by a competent judicial organ or, 
collectively, by the states themselves" (ICRC 2009 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-020609 10); 
Fenrick 2009 YIHL 300. 
35  Van der Toorn 2009 http://www.works.bepress.com/damien_van_der_toorn/1 22.  
36  Fenrick 2009 YIHL 300. 
37  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 670; Goodman and Jinks 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 638. 
38  "The notion of direct participation in hostilities refers to specific acts carried out by individuals as 
part of the conduct of hostilities between parties to an armed conflict" (ICRC 2009 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-020609 45-46). 
39  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 10. 
40  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 10. 
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Even prior to the first meeting of the experts, it was apparent that there were 
divergent opinions on how one should interpret the concept of direct participation in 
hostilities. Some academics favoured a more restricted interpretation, equating 
direct participation with actual combat.41Others believed a more liberal interpretation 
was appropriate,42 and favoured: 
… an approach … which essentially encompasses all conduct that functionally 
corresponds to that of government armed forces, including not only the actual 
conduct of hostilities, but also the activities such as planning, organising, recruiting 
and assuming logistical functions.43  
These competing approaches were not new to the ICRC. Already in the commentary 
on AP I, the ICRC has noted that: 
… to restrict this concept to combat and active military operations would be too 
narrow, while extending it to the entire war effort would be too broad.44 
Given this background, it was not surprising that the guide has generated some 
heated academic debates.45 At the heart of much of the generalised criticism leveled 
at the Interpretive Guide is its alleged failure to adequately balance humanitarian 
concerns and military necessity in the manner intended by the Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocols.46 Schmitt and Boothby are critical of what they claim is an 
overly-restrictive interpretation.47 Boothby48 argues that "the ICRC interprets the 
concepts of preparation, deployment, and return too restrictively", and Schmitt49 is 
concerned with the fact that the definition "excludes support activities not directly 
causing harm to the enemy". On the contrary:  
                                        
41  See, for example, Ben-Naftali and Michaeli 2003 Cornell Int'l LJ 233; Schondorf 2007 JICJ 301; 
Melzer Targeted Killings 335. 
42  See, for example, Schmitt 2004 http://www.michaelschmitt.org/images/Schmitfinal.pdf; Heaton 
2005 A F L Rev 155. 
43  As Melzer notes, the liberal approach "stands in contradiction not only to the prevailing opinion in 
the doctrine, but also to state practice, and to the express distinction drawn in convention law 
between direct participation in hostilities on the one hand, and work of a military character, 
activities in support of military operations and an activity linked to the military effort, on the 
other hand" (Melzer Targeted Killings 338-339). 
44  Melzer Targeted Killings 336. 
45  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 698. 
46  Van der Toorn 2009 http://www.works.bepress.com/damien_van_der_toorn/1 45. 
47  Van der Toorn 2009 http://www.works.bepress.com/damien_van_der_toorn/1 45. 
48  Boothby 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 743. 
49  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 835. 
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… other experts would criticise the Interpretive Guide's definition as too generous 
because, in certain circumstances, it might allow the targeting of civilians who do 
not pose an immediate threat to the enemy.50 
Some academics have concluded that "the deficiencies identified demonstrate a 
general failure to fully appreciate the operational complexity of modern warfare".51  
Others have questioned whether the Interpretive Guide achieves what it set out to 
do - to provide a generally accepted interpretation of the term.52 Some have argued 
that, rather than re-stating the law in a manner that would prove useful for 
practitioners and courts, terms like: 
… "revolving door of protection", "continuous combat function", and "persistent 
recurring basis" inject new, confusing, and difficult-to-justify concepts into the 
lexicon of IHL.53  
In response to these criticisms, Melzer (the chief author of the guide) maintains that 
the Interpretive Guide adopted a neutral, impartial and balanced approach - resisting 
proposals coming from both extremes, while ensuring "a clear and coherent 
interpretation of IHL consistent with its underlying purposes and principles".54 Aside 
from these differences in the degree of interpretation, there is much less controversy 
around the all-important heart of the guidance: determining how one defines direct 
participation in hostilities.55 All in all, after careful consideration of the critiques 
prepared by Watkin, Schmitt, Boothby, and Parks, nothing indicates that the ICRC's 
Interpretive Guide is: 
 … substantively inaccurate, unbalanced, or otherwise inappropriate, or that its 
recommendations cannot be realistically translated into operational practice.56 
  
                                        
50  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 835. 
51  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 699.  
52  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 694. 
53  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 693; 837. 
54  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 836. 
55  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 834. 
56   Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 915. 
S BOSCH PER / PELJ 2014(17)3 
1007 
4  The specific hostile acts which amount to direct participation in 
hostilities 
The concept of direct participation in hostilities is the means of determining when 
civilians' actions compromise their otherwise protected civilian immunity.57 According 
to the ICRC's Interpretive Guide, before an act amounts to direct participation in 
hostilities it must meet three cumulative criteria: 
(1) The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military 
capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, 
or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold 
of harm); and 
(2) There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result 
either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act 
constitutes an integral part (direct causation); and 
(3) The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold 
of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another 
(belligerent nexus).58 
4.1 The threshold of harm 
The first criterion - also called the "threshold of harm" determination - requires that 
harm:59  
(a) of a military quality, or60  
                                        
57  Until such time as the civilian's actions amount to direct participation in hostilities, any "use of 
force against him or her must comply with the standards of law enforcement or individual self-
defence" (Boothby 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 755-756). Since the "loss is temporary", Melzer 
suggests that it is "better described as a 'suspension' of protection" (Melzer Targeted Killings 
347); Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 704. 
58  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 46-47. 
59  The degree of harm includes "not only the infliction of death, injury, or destruction on military 
personnel and objects, but essentially any consequence adversely affecting the military 
operations or military capacity of a party to the conflict" (ICRC 2009 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-020609 97). 
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(b) harm ("by inflicting death, injury or destruction")61 of a protected person or 
object,  
must be reasonably expected to result from a civilian's actions before the civilian can 
be said to be participating directly in hostilities.62 Or to put it another way, in order 
for civilians to lose their immunity from direct attack: 
… they must either harm the enemy's military operations or capacity, or they must 
use means and methods of warfare directly against protected persons or objects.63 
All that is required is the likelihood that the act bring about this sort of harm, not 
that the harm necessarily materialise.64 Moreover, it is not the "quantum of harm 
caused the enemy" which determines whether or not it reaches the necessary 
threshold of harm criterion 65 - but rather the nature of the intended harm. I turn 
now to unpack these two categories of harm in more detail. 
4.1.1  Military harm 
As Melzer66 points out, while military harm is commonplace in armed conflicts, the 
term applies only to objects which "contribute militarily" to the belligerent's success. 
The term military harm cannot be used in respect of civilian objects, despite the fact 
                                                                                                                          
60  From a cursory examination of the criterion, it is apparent that the test is framed in the 
alternative, that is, "the harm contemplated may either adversely affect the enemy or harm 
protected persons or objects" (Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 713). 
61  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 47. 
62  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 47. 
63  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 862. 
64  This is assessed objectively as "harm which may reasonably be expected to result from an act in 
the prevailing circumstances" (ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-
participation-ihl-feature-020609 33, 47). As was discussed at the expert meeting, "wherever a 
civilian had a subjective 'intent' to cause harm that was objectively identifiable, there would also 
be an objective 'likelihood' that he or she would cause such harm" (Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & 
Pol 724). Schmitt concedes that this is a sensible requirement since it would be "absurd to 
suggest that a civilian shooting at a combatant, but missing, would not be directly participating 
because no harm resulted" (Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 724). 
65  Schmitt observes that perhaps the choice of the label "threshold", which is a quantitative 
concept, was "unfortunate", when the substance of the test talks to the "nature of the harm", 
the performance of a specified act, and not that the act reaches a "particular threshold" (Schmitt 
2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 716). 
66  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 858. 
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that these objects may contribute to the military success of a particular belligerent.67 
This interpretation, in line with the universally accepted definition of what constitutes 
a military objective, excludes those political, economic and psychological 
contributions which might play a role in a military victory but ain isolation are not 
considered military objects.68 The term military harm includes: 
… not only the infliction of death, injury, or destruction on military personnel and 
objects, but essentially any consequence adversely affecting the military operations 
or military capacity of a party to the conflict.69  
4.1.2  Attacks against protected persons 
In accordance with treaty law, a civilian's actions might amount to direct 
participation in hostilities when their actions constitute attacks specifically aimed at 
civilians and civilian objects - despite the fact that such actions might cause no 
specific military harm.70 However, acts which fall short of causing military harm are 
required at a minimum to "cause at least death, injury, or destruction of these 
civilians or civilian objects".71 Such acts are distinguished from harm resulting from 
"political, diplomatic, economic, or administrative measures like for example 
deportation".72 Where protected persons are the target of an attack, these actions 
                                        
67  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 717. 
68  For example, when a "broadcast station is used to demoralise the enemy civilian population" by 
"broadcasting negative messages to the enemy civilian population" (Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & 
Pol 717). 
69  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 47. 
70  The Interpretive Guide relies on AP I art 49's definition of "attack", which "does not specify the 
target, but the belligerent nexus of an attack, so that even acts of violence directed specifically 
against civilians or civilian objects may amount to direct participation in hostilities" (Schmitt 2010 
NYU J Int'l L & Pol 723). Legal precedence for this position can be found in the jurisprudence 
emerging from the ICTY, where it was concluded that "sniping attacks against civilians and 
bombardment of civilian villages or urban residential areas" constitutes an "attack" in the IHL 
sense of the word (Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 723). Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 860-
861; ICRC 2009 www.icrc.org 49. 
71  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 49. 
72  Examples of these include the "building of fences or road blocks; the interruption of electricity, 
water, or food supplies; and the manipulation of computer networks not directly resulting in 
death, injury, or destruction. While all of these activities may adversely affect public security, 
health, and commerce, they would not, in the absence of military harm, qualify as direct 
participation in hostilities" (Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 862); Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 
723. 
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must not only rise to this minimum degree of harm, but they must also be part of 
the armed hostilities.73  
4.1.3  Activities which have been cited as satisfying the threshold of harm 
requirement74 
These include "acts of violence against human and material enemy forces";75 
sabotaging or causing "physical or functional damage to military objects, operations 
or capacity";76 hindering military "deployments, logistics and communications";77 
controlling or hindering the use of "military personnel, objects and territory, to the 
detriment of the adversary";78 demining the opposition's mines; "guarding captured 
military personnel to prevent them being forcibly liberated";79 interfering with 
"military computer networks";80 "wiretapping the adversary's high command or 
transmitting tactical targeting information for an attack";81 directly targeting civilians 
or civilian objects;82 "building defensive positions at a military base certain to be 
attacked";83 and "repairing a battle-damaged runway at a forward airfield so it can 
be used to launch aircraft".84  
                                        
73  For example, a "prison guard may kill a prisoner for purely private reasons" without his actions 
amounting to direct participation in hostilities, but were he to engage in "a practice of killing 
prisoners of a particular ethnic group during an ethnic conflict", those actions would meet the 
standard (Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 862, 723). 
74  According to Schmitt, most of these examples proved uncontroversial (Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L 
& Pol 715). 
75  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 48. 
76  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 47-48. 
77  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 48. 
78  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 48. 
79  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 48. 
80  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 715. 
81  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 48. 
82  Solis Law of Armed Conflict 203; ICRC 2009 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-020609 49. 
83  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 859. 
84  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 859. 
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4.1.4  Activities which have been cited as falling short of the threshold of harm 
requirement  
These include "building fences or roadblocks";85 disturbing "electricity, water, or food 
supplies";86 assuming control of cars and fuel;87 manipulating computer networks;88 
arresting or deporting individuals who potentially have a "serious impact on public 
security, health, and commerce";89 declining appeals "to engage in actions that 
would positively affect one of the parties";90 the civilian rescuing of aircrew 
members;91 and producing improvised explosive devices.92  
4.1.5  Critique of the threshold of harm requirement 
The threshold of harm requirement has been criticised mainly for being under-
inclusive and unduly difficult to satisfy. Jensen93 gives expression to this when he 
comments that the: 
… actual harm standard from the ICRC commentary is too restrictive in that it fails 
to address individuals who, although they are not members of an armed group that 
is party to the conflict, still openly support hostilities by constructing, financing, or 
storing weapons and materials of warfare.  
He is in favour of an interpretation which would see some differentiation between 
those civilians found financing, storing or assembling weapons, and civilians who 
steer clear of any association with the hostilities.94 Jensen95 would also support an 
interpretation of direct participation, which would: 
                                        
85  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 48. 
86  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 48. 
87  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 48. 
88  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 48. 
89  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 48. 
90  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 719. 
91  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 860. 
92  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 860. 
93  Jensen "Direct Participation in Hostilities" 2221-2228. 
94  Jensen "Direct Participation in Hostilities" 2221-2228. 
95  Jensen "Direct Participation in Hostilities" 2221-2228. 
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… include not only those who cause actual harm, but those who directly support 
those who cause actual harm … this would also include those who gather 
intelligence, or act as observers and supply information to fighters, those who 
solicit others to participate in hostilities, and those who train them on military 
tactics. 
In his critique Schmitt raises a similar concern:  
… strict application of the threshold of harm constitutive element would exclude 
conduct that by a reasonable assessment should amount to direct participation.96 
Having said that, Schmitt97 himself concedes that the treaty definition of a military 
objective favours limiting the notion of direct participation to refer only to harm of a 
military nature; in short, "an act of direct participation must impact the enemy's 
military wherewithal". Nevertheless, Schmitt98 argues that the military harm 
requirement is "under-inclusive because it excludes loss of protection for support 
activities which do not adversely affect the enemy". In respect of attacks which 
target protected persons Schmitt99 disputes the ICRC's interpretation, which requires 
death or destruction, because he argues that such an interpretation will exclude 
activities such as civilian deportation or civilian hostage taking. Instead, he suggests: 
… a better standard is one which includes any harmful acts directed against 
protected persons or objects, when said acts are either part of the armed conflict's 
war strategy … or when there is an evident relationship with ongoing hostilities,100 
even if such acts do not result in death or destruction. Schmitt101 argues that this 
strict requirement clearly favours humanitarian concerns over notions of military 
necessity. 
Heaton102 is also critical of this strict interpretation for its failure to include within its 
ambit the "essential links in the chain immediately preceding that final step". 
                                        
96  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 714. 
97  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 859. 
98  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 859; 861.  
99  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 723. 
100  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 861. 
101  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 714. 
102  Van der Toorn 2009 http://www.works.bepress.com/damien_van_der_toorn/1 37. 
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Heaton103 argues that the final act of the combatant is heavily reliant on the 
personnel who support and make combative actions possible.  
In reply to his critics, Melzer104 cautions against any suggestion of diluting the 
required threshold of harm. He fears that such a move would result in a wide range 
of support personnel losing their immunity against direct targeting, and would result 
in: 
… undermining the generally recognised distinction between direct participation in 
hostilities and mere involvement in the general war effort. 
4.2  The direct causation requirement 
The second requirement, also termed the direct causation test, was included as a 
response to the controversy traditionally surrounding questions about whether or not 
a "general war effort"105 and activities aimed at sustaining war106 would amount to 
direct participation in hostilities. While it is certainly true that war-sustaining 
activities are indispensable to the war effort, which in effect harms the adversary, a 
line must be drawn between the two degrees of involvement.107 All the experts 
present at the ICRC's expert meetings were:  
… agreed on the centrality of a relatively close relationship between the act in 
question and the consequences affecting the ongoing hostilities.108 
Schmitt109 expresses it well: 
                                        
103  Van der Toorn 2009 http://www.works.bepress.com/damien_van_der_toorn/1 37. 
104  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 877. 
105  This includes, for example, the "design, production and shipment of weapons and military 
equipment; construction or repair of roads, ports, airports, bridges, railways and other 
infrastructure outside the context of concrete military operations" (ICRC 2009 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-020609 53). 
106  This would additionally include "political propaganda, financial transactions, production of 
agricultural or non-military industrial goods" (ICRC 2009 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-020609 53). 
107  During the expert meetings emphasis was placed on the "idea that direct participation in 
hostilities is neither synonymous with 'involvement in' or 'contribution to' hostilities, nor with 
'preparing' or 'enabling' someone else to directly participate in hostilities, but essentially means 
that an individual is personally 'taking part in the ongoing exercise of harming the enemy' and 
personally carrying out hostile acts which are 'part of' the hostilities" (ICRC 2009 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-020609 53).  
108  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 725. 
109  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 726. 
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… sometimes causation is so direct that the shield of humanitarian considerations 
must yield in the face of military necessity, while in other situations the causal 
connection is too weak (or indirect) to overcome humanitarian factors. 
As a result, and so as to prevent depriving the civilian population of their protected 
status, there must be a close causal link between the hostile act and the resulting 
harm before the action can be said to qualify as direct participation in hostilities.110  
According to the ICRC's Interpretive Guide, this notion of direct causation is 
understood as meaning that there is only one causal step between the hostile act 
and the resulting harm.111 This notion of direct causation excludes activities that 
indirectly cause harm.112 Similarly mere "temporal or geographic proximity"113 is 
insufficient to justify a finding of direct participation. Moreover, in cases of collective 
operations, the ICRC's Interpretive Guide does recognise that:  
… the resulting harm does not have to be directly caused by each contributing 
person individually, but only by the collective operation as a whole.114  
In short, where a particular activity does not result in the required degree of harm, 
those individual actions might nevertheless constitute direct participation in 
hostilities where the actors are "part of a collective operation"115 that directly causes 
harm of the required threshold. 
4.2.1  Activities which have been cited as satisfying the direct causation requirement 
                                        
110  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 726. 
111  In short, where an "individual's conduct ... merely builds up or maintains the capacity of a party 
to harm its adversary, or which otherwise only indirectly causes harm, these actions do not 
amount to direct participation in hostilities" (ICRC 2009 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-020609 53, 55; 
Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 866). 
112  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 56. 
113  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 56. 
114  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 866. 
115  Examples of such acts would include, inter alia, "the identification and marking of targets; the 
analysis and transmission of tactical intelligence to attacking forces; and the instruction and 
assistance given to troops for the execution of a specific military operation" (ICRC 2009 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-020609 55); 
Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 865; Kalshoven and Zegveld Constraints on the Waging of War 
102. 
S BOSCH PER / PELJ 2014(17)3 
1015 
These include "bearing, using or taking up arms";116 "taking part in military or hostile 
acts, activities, conduct or operations";117 "participating in attacks against enemy 
personnel, property or equipment";118 "coordinated tactical operations which directly 
cause harm";119 engaging in sabotage of military installations;120 manning an anti-
aircraft gun;121 supervising the operation of weaponry;122 "gathering tactical 
intelligence on the battlefield";123 transmitting military information for immediate 
use;124 "identifying and marking targets";125 "instruction and assistance given to 
troops for the execution of a specific military operation";126 transporting weapons in 
proximity to combat operations;127 "transporting unlawful combatants to or from the 
place where the hostilities are taking place";128 "serving as guards, intelligence 
agents, lookouts, or observers on behalf of military forces";129 "capturing combatants 
or their equipment";130 "sabotaging lines of communication";131 "performing mission-
essential work at a military base";132 "providing logistical support";133 and "delivering 
ammunition to combatants".134 
4.2.2  Activities which have been cited as falling short of the direct causation 
requirement 
                                        
116  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 707; Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 708. 
117  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 707. 
118  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 707. 
119  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 55. 
120  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 707. 
121  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 707. 
122  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 708. 
123  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 867; Heaton 2005 A F L Rev 177-178; Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L 
& Pol 708. 
124  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 707; ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/ 
direct-participation-ihl-feature-020609 55. 
125  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 55. 
126  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 55. 
127  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 707. 
128  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 708. 
129  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 707; ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/ 
siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-020609 49 
130  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 708. 
131  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 708. 
132  Heaton 2005 A F L Rev 177-178. 
133  Heaton 2005 A F L Rev 177-178. 
134  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 708. 
S BOSCH PER / PELJ 2014(17)3 
1016 
These include "designing, producing and shipping weapons";135 "transporting arms 
and munitions";136 purchasing materials in order "to build suicide 
vests";137purchasing, smuggling, assembling or storing "improvised explosive 
devices";138 gathering and transmitting military information;139 work undertaken by 
civilians in military vehicle maintenance depots;140 work undertaken by civilians in 
munitions factories;141 "driving military transport vehicles" where the driver is a 
civilian;142 "activities in support of the war or military effort";143 "the recruitment and 
general training of personnel";144 "providing specialist advice regarding the selection 
of military personnel, their training, or the correct maintenance of the 
weapons";145"general strategic analysis";146 "voluntary human shielding";147 
"expressing sympathy for the cause of one of the parties to the conflict";148 
distributing war propaganda;149 "failing to act to prevent an incursion by one of the 
parties to the conflict";150 "contributing funds to a cause";151"economic sanctions";152 
and "providing an adversary with supplies (for example food and medicine) and 
services".153 
4.2.3  Critique of the direct causation requirement 
Schmitt raises a number of technical issues in respect of the ICRC's explanation 
relating to the direct causation requirement. His first critique questions why the 
                                        
135  Fenrick 2009 YIHL 293. 
136  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 707. While the "act of driving a munitions truck might not 
amount to direct participation in hostilities ... the truck itself remains a targetable military 
objective" (Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 710). 
137  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 865. 
138  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 865. 
139  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 707. 
140  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 706.  
141  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 710. 
142  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 706.  
143  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 707; Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 710. 
144  Solis Law of Armed Conflict 204; Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 865 and 867; Schmitt 2010 NYU 
J Int'l L & Pol 728. 
145  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 707. 
146  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 708. 
147  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 865. 
148  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 707. 
149  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 708. 
150  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 707. 
151  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 708, 727. 
152  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 728. 
153  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 728; Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 707. 
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authors of the interpretive guide settled on direct causation being linked to a 
physical act causing harm, when in modern warfare "acts that directly enhance the 
military capacity or operations of a party, without resulting in direct and immediate 
harm to the enemy"154 may have a marked effect on the belligerent's capacity to win. 
Schmitt155 argues that: 
… the key is whether the acts in question are sufficiently causally related to the 
resulting harm/benefit to qualify as directly caused. 
Moreover, Schmitt156 argues, the effect of the one causal step requirement is that a 
range of activities aimed at building capacity (which Schmitt concedes are indirect in 
nature) are excluded from those parameters. Schmitt157 prefers the "integral part 
test" which makes it possible to "extend participation as far up and downstream as 
there is a causal link". In a similar vein, Watkin158 argues that the role played by 
logistics in a military sense has not been adequately recognized in the direct 
causation requirement. Watkin159 warns that the causal-chain requirement limits 
responses to a "reactive posture focused on acts rather than on the capacity of an 
opponent to plan and attack in the future". 
Van der Toorn160 raises a related criticism when he suggests a sound interpretation 
of direct participation in hostilities should extend beyond the specific activities to 
"include precursor operational activities that facilitate and are closely connected with 
the materialisation of harm".161 
 As the ICRC's interpretation stands at the moment, participation is understood as 
"single, discrete acts"162 which in effect allow civilians to interrupt their hostilities 
                                        
154  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 736, 725. 
155  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 736. 
156  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 727. Melzer notes that "states frequently use civilian contractors 
or employees to carry out roughly equivalent activities" (Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 865). 
157  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 729; Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 866-867. 
158  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 684. 
159  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 658. 
160  Van der Toorn 2009 http://www.works.bepress.com/damien_van_der_toorn/1 39. 
161  Which might include: "operational level planning; general intelligence activities; military logistics; 
military communications; and IED assembly and combat instruction" (Van der Toorn 2009 
http://www.works.bepress.com/damien_van_der_toorn/1 39). 
162  Van der Toorn 2009 http://www.works.bepress.com/damien_van_der_toorn/1 30. 
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with numerous periods during which they continue with their civilian lifestyles. Van 
der Toorn163 argues that the ICRC's direct causation requirement needs to balance 
the needs of military necessity and humanitarian concerns more effectively. In this 
regard, his proposal would: 
… permit the targeting of the precursor operational activities that make possible the 
ultimate infliction of harm.164 
Melzer165 warns that Schmitt's "integrated part test" would translate into an 
unnecessarily permissive understanding of direct causation, and that in effect: 
 … any act connected with the resulting harm through a causal link would 
automatically qualify as direct participation in hostilities, no matter how far removed 
the act may be from the final harm caused. 
Melzer166 warns that any such relaxation of the direct causation test would result in  
"excessively broad targeting policies, prone to error, arbitrariness, and abuse".  
According to Melzer,167 there is no indication on the part of states by way of general 
opinio juris that would favour Schmitt's integrated part interpretation over the ICRC's 
direct causation requirement. 
4.3   The belligerent nexus requirement 
According to the ICRC's Interpretive Guide, the final requirement is that the specific 
harm must have a link to the hostilities.168 The belligerent nexus requirement is there 
to ensure that those criminal activities which are simply facilitated by the hostilities 
and not intended to specifically support one party while causing the requisite 
threshold of harm to the opposing party are excluded from the purview of direct 
participation in hostilities.169 As Rogers170 points out, in "the case of children throwing 
                                        
163  Van der Toorn 2009 http://www.works.bepress.com/damien_van_der_toorn/1 37. 
164  Van der Toorn 2009 http://www.works.bepress.com/damien_van_der_toorn/1 37. 
165  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 867.  
166  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 867. 
167  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 868. 
168  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 62. 
169  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 63, 64. 
170  Rogers 2004 YIHL 19. 
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petrol bombs or stones at enemy military patrols", members of the patrol will have 
to assess carefully whether their actions are just common criminal activities or 
whether the children have forfeited their inherent civilian immunity from direct 
targeting through these actions. 
In short, this leg of the test requires that: 
… an act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of 
harm, in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another.171 
In other words hostile actions (for example looting or other civil unrest) which are 
not intended to harm a specific party to the conflict while supporting the opposing 
party do not amount to direct participation in hostilities.172 
So, for example, if civilians are found causing harm: 
(c) in individual self-defence or defence of others;173  
(d) in exercising power or authority over persons or territory; 
(e) as part of civil unrest against such authority; or  
(f) during inter-civilian violence, 
 their acts will not be regarded as participating in hostilities, since these acts lack the 
requisite belligerent nexus.174 Moreover: 
… when civilians are totally unaware of the role they are playing in the conduct of 
hostilities… or when they are completely deprived of their physical freedom of 
action... they cannot be regarded as performing an action in any meaningful sense 
                                        
171  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 64. 
172  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 735; Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 873. 
173  "If individual self-defence against prohibited violence were to entail loss of protection against 
direct attack, this would have the absurd consequence of legitimising a previously unlawful 
attack" (ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-
feature-020609 61). 
174  Consequently they must be dealt with by means of the regular law-enforcement mechanisms 
(ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 64; Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 873; Van der Toorn 2009 
http://www.works.bepress.com/damien_van_der_toorn/1 19). 
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and, therefore, remain protected against direct attack despite the belligerent nexus 
of the military operation in which they are being instrumentalised.175 
4.3.1  Activities cited as satisfying the belligerent nexus requirement 
These include the "preparatory collection of tactical intelligence";176 "loading 
explosives in a suicide vehicle";177 "transporting personnel";178 and "positioning 
weapons and equipment".179 
 4.3.2  Activities cited as falling short of the belligerent nexus requirement 
These include "hiding or smuggling weapons";180 and "financial or political support of 
armed individuals".181 
4.3.3  Critique of the belligerent nexus requirement 
While Schmitt182 supports the notion that there must be a link to the hostilities, he 
favours the belligerent nexus test's being formulated in the alternative: "in support 
of a party to the conflict or to the detriment of another". Melzer183 warns that a 
disjunctive interpretation of these two aspects of the belligerent nexus test would 
permit a belligerent to respond with military force against criminal elements who had 
no connection to the armed conflict. IHL does not permit a person to be categorised 
as a military target until it can be shown that the person has some link to a 
belligerent party. Instead, as IHL stands at present, such instances will be dealt with 
as any other threat to security.184 
  
                                        
175  For example, when a driver is "unaware that he is transporting a remote-controlled bomb", or 
when involuntary human shields are "physically coerced into providing cover in close combat" 
(ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 60). 
176  Solis Law of Armed Conflict 204-205. 
177  Solis Law of Armed Conflict 204-205. 
178  Solis Law of Armed Conflict 204-205. 
179  Solis Law of Armed Conflict 204-205. 
180  Solis Law of Armed Conflict 204-205. 
181  Solis Law of Armed Conflict 204-205. 
182  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 736. 
183  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 873. 
184  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 873. 
S BOSCH PER / PELJ 2014(17)3 
1021 
4.4   General comments regarding specific hostile acts which amount to 
direct participation in hostilities  
Schmitt185 concedes that all three legs of the test for direct participation in hostilities 
represent legitimate factors which have a valid role to play in assessing when 
civilians' actions compromise their immunity against direct targeting. However, the 
thrust of his criticism is that there are insufficiencies to be found in each of the 
elements, which give rise to what he considers to be an "under-inclusive"186 notion of 
direct participation in hostilities. Schmitt's187 concern is that this pro-humanitarian 
treatment of the concept of direct participation reveals an ignorance of the realities 
of the modern battlefield. Rogers188 is of the opposite view and supports a narrow 
interpretation of direct participation, which will not risk jeopardising the IHL principle 
of distinction and civilian immunity from direct targeting. To this end Melzer189 notes 
that there were several safeguards built into the three constitutive elements to 
ensure that the test would not permit the arbitrary or erroneous targeting of 
civilians. Despite their criticism, many like Schmitt190 concede that the Interpretive 
Guide is: 
… superior to the various ad hoc lists because it provides those tasked with 
applying the norm on the battlefield with guidelines against which to gauge an 
action. 
5  The temporal element of loss of protection "for such time as" 
civilians take a direct part in hostilities 
In terms of IHL, civilians normally enjoy complete immunity against attack for such 
time as they refrain from any direct participation in hostilities. However, as soon as 
civilians compromise their civilian immunity by electing to participate directly in 
hostilities, their actions expose other truly innocent civilians to "erroneous or 
                                        
185  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 739. 
186  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 739. 
187  Schmitt 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 739. 
188  Rogers 2004 YIHL 19. 
189  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 877. 
190  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 877. 
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arbitrary attack".191 Consequently, in order to dissuade civilians from abusing their 
civilian immunity, IHL condones the temporary suspension of their civilian immunity 
against direct targeting, for so long as they participate directly in hostilities.192 
Expressed another way: 
… considerations of military necessity are presumed to override those of humanity 
for such time as a civilian "directly participates in hostilities".193 
While their civilian immunity is temporarily suspended, this has no effect on their 
primary IHL status as civilians.194 At no time do they lose their civilian status and 
assume primary combatant status.195 Moreover, when they cease their participation, 
they resume full civilian immunity against attack. This temporary suspension of a 
civilian's immunity against direct attack is afforded only "civilians who participate in 
hostilities in a spontaneous, unorganised or sporadic basis".196 Consequently, once it 
has been determined that a civilian has carried out a specific act which amounts to 
direct participation in hostilities, the next level of enquiry must address determining 
the beginning and end of the loss of civilian immunity.197  
The notion that direct participation has a temporal limitation has a longstanding 
history in IHL, having been in existence since the mid-nineteenth century.198 The 
phrase "for such time as", as it appears in AP I, "is binding as a matter of treaty law 
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on ... approximately eighty-five per cent of the world's states".199 Not surprisingly, 
the ICRC's study into the customary international law status of the phrase "and for 
such time as" concluded that it was widely recognised as constituting customary 
international law.200 
While the "for such time as" criterion might reflect customary international law, its 
practical implementation has not been without controversy. For the most part, the 
controversy lies in that fact that when civilians are no longer engaged in direct 
participation, and consequently no longer pose a threat to the opposition, they 
regain their full civilian immunity from direct attack, giving rise to what is called the 
"revolving door" of civilian protection.201 The terminology "revolving door" - whereby 
civilians might vacillate between being a belligerent and reserving the right to 
reclaim their civilian status - was first coined by Hays Parks202 in his 1990s 
commentary on the practical effect of AP I. 
5.1 The parameters of the "for such time" window: execution, 
preparation, deployment and withdrawal 
The Interpretive Guide expressly recognises that the concept of direct participation 
in hostilities includes not only the obvious individual armed activities but also those 
unarmed activities which have an adverse effect on the opposing belligerent.203 
Naturally the execution of a specific hostile act, which amounts to direct participation 
in hostilities, will fall within the "for such time" window and amount to a temporary 
loss of immunity from attack.204 Furthermore, given the fact that contemporary 
military activities are often the result of several collective actions, an interpretation 
of direct participation in hostilities must include those activities which cause harm 
only "in conjunction with other acts".205 Consequently, the ICRC's Interpretive Guide 
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includes "measures preparatory to the execution of a specific act ... as well as the 
deployment to and the return from the location of its execution",206 as comprising an 
"integral part of the specific hostile act".207 The ICRC Guide cites as examples:  
… equipping, instructing, and transporting personnel; gathering intelligence; and 
preparing, transporting and positioning weapons and equipment,208 
if these are carried out as preparation for the undertaking of a specific hostile act. 
These preparations for a specific hostile act are to be distinguished from preparatory 
activities which merely establish a generalised capability to perpetrate hostile 
actions, which do not amount to direct participation in hostilities.209 Preparations 
which are part of a generalised "campaign of unspecified operations"210 or are merely 
capacity building do not fall within the scope of the activities for which civilian 
immunity can be forfeited. Examples of such general preparations include: 
… the purchase, smuggling, production, and hiding of weapons; recruitment and 
training of personnel; and financial, political, and administrative support to armed 
actors.211 
Where the particular hostile act does not necessitate any prior deployment, the loss 
of civilian immunity is limited to the integral preparations and the actual execution of 
the hostile act.212 On the other hand, where the specific hostile act necessitates 
preparatory deployment to a particular location, those preparatory deployment 
activities will also form an integral part of the hostile act - and result in the loss of 
civilian immunity.213 For an activity to amount to a deployment which will 
compromise a civilian's immunity, a deploying individual must be seen to be 
relocating in a physical manner with the intention of carrying out the specific hostile 
                                        
206  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 65; Boothby 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 750; Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 880-881. 
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act.214 Similarly, in instances where withdrawal activities remain integral to the 
hostile action, such withdrawal remains a part of the "for such time window",215 and 
full civilian immunity is fully restored only once it is evident that the civilian has 
physically distanced himself from the hostile operation.216 Civilians can demonstrate 
their complete disengagement "by laying down, storing or hiding the weapons or 
other equipment used, and resuming activities distinct from that operation".217 
5.2 A critique of the "revolving door" concept 
The most commonly cited criticism leveled at the "revolving door" phenomenon is 
that it gives rise to a profound operational advantage for those civilians who vacillate 
between hostile acts and peaceful civilian existence.218 It is suggested that this 
revolving door creates an uneven playing field, in that regular combatants (be they 
cooks or infantry) are at all times potential targets for attack, while civilians abusing 
this revolving door can claim full immunity from direct targeting and yet launch 
"spontaneous, unorganised or sporadic"219 attacks from behind these protected 
positions.220 In this regard Watkin221 agrees that it is difficult to rationalise the tactical 
advantage which the revolving door affords the civilian, particularly since there 
appears to be no limitation222 on the number of times the civilian can walk through 
the door. Some even suggest that "a civilian can go through the revolving door on a 
persistently recurring basis".223 
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Moreover, there is always potential for this interpretation of the "revolving door of 
protection" to be abused by non-state actors.224 
Some writers, like Boothby,225 argue that the notion of a revolving door is not found 
in customary IHL, and that the way the Guide has interpreted the treaty reference to 
"participation" excludes the possibility that a civilian might be classified as a 
"persistent civilian participator". 226 Boothby227 argues that there must be a way to 
distinguish between genuinely sporadic acts and "repeated or persistent acts" of 
direct participation in hostilities. Boothby228 proposes that the time dimension to the 
rule: 
… must permit the targeting of those who, whether voluntarily or otherwise, choose 
to participate on a persistent or regular basis in the conflict, whether they are or 
are not members of organised armed groups. 
Boothby229 argues that states (like Israel and the US) are unlikely to adopt an 
interpretation which would afford the benefit of the revolving door to those civiliains 
who engage in regular (albeit unorganised) direct participation by a civilian, when he 
suggests they should lose their protected status "while such persistent or repeated 
involvement in hostilities continues".  
The Interpretive Guide warns that it would be too difficult to reliably ascertain 
whether a civilian had previously carried out a hostile act in a manner which might 
be said to be "persistently recurring" and whether they might be said to have the 
requisite intent to do so again.230 
Moreover, as Melzer231 points out, Boothby fails to provide a reliable tool to assess 
these notions of "sporadic and repeated" hostile acts in practice. 
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Furthermore, as Jensen232 asserts: 
… any extension of the concept of direct participation in hostilities beyond specific 
acts would blur the distinction made in IHL233 between temporary activity-based 
loss of protection (due to direct participation in hostilities) and continuous, status- 
or function-based loss of protection (due to combatant status or continuous combat 
function).  
While it does seem bizarre to afford civilians immunity from direct targeting when 
they have already participated directly in hostilities and show continuing intent to do 
so again,234 Melzer235 maintains that this scenario is unlikely to pose a major problem 
in reality. In the rare instances where it does occur,236 these civilians can be dealt 
with through normal legal enforcement channels during the intermissions between 
hostile acts.237 
Another aspect of the temporal approach adopted by the ICRC's Interpretive Guide 
which has come under criticism is its interpretation of which preparatory, 
deployment or withdrawal activities amount to unprotected direct participation in 
hostilities. Jensen238 proposed that: 
… a modern view of "for such time" must include the full time that an individual is 
directly participating, not just the time that results in actual harm.  
Consequently, Jensen239 is of the view that even those instructing or training those 
intending to take part in hostile acts can lose their immunity from direct targeting. 
Boothby240 is also critical of what he describes as a "restrictive" interpretation of the 
preparatory activities that amount to direct participation in hostilities. According to 
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Boothby:241 
… "participate" could also refer to individual involvement in "groups or sequences of 
activity spread over a period," with the effect that the civilian in question would lose 
protection for the entire period of his involvement, including in the intervals 
between specific hostile acts. 
Boothby242 favours an interpretation which regards any preparatory acts (including 
any necessary prior deployment) as constituting direct participation.  
The ICRC's Interpretive Guide acknowledges that the net effect of the "revolving 
door" phenomenon will limit attacks on civilian participants.243 It justifies the 
revolving door position as being a necessary safeguard rather than a "malfunction"244 
of the Guide aimed at preventing civilians being targeted arbitrarily or in error when 
they do not constitute a military objective.245 Any interpretation which has the effect 
of increasing the degree of risk to innocent civilians is squarely at odds with any 
reading of the treaty provisions read in the light of their object and purpose.246 
6  The "continuous combat function" and its implications for civilians 
participating directly in hostilities 
6.1 The rationale behind the concept of the "continuous combat 
function" 
The term "continuous combat function" was first coined at the expert discussions 
which gave rise to the ICRC's Interpretive Guide.247 During the discussions the view 
was expressed that, since the revolving door of protection was intended to apply 
only to those spontaneous and unorganised acts of participation, it should not also 
be applied to members of organised non-state armed groups, since their activities 
were oftentimes neither unorganised nor spontaneous.248 It was felt that organised 
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armed groups (who fell short of the requirements for full combatant status) would 
benefit unfairly from a considerable tactical advantage if the revolving door 
phenomenon were extended to them - while the state's armed force would be 
vulnerable to potential attacks on a continuous basis.249 While there is, under IHL, no 
express provision authorising civilians to participate directly in hostilities, that fact 
does not necessarily translate into "an international prohibition (or criminalisation) of 
such participation".250 Nevertheless, at the expert meetings the concern was raised 
that such inequality between the states' armed forces and organised non-state 
armed groups would not only undermine any respect for IHL but as a consequence 
would further endanger innocent civilian lives.251 Rogers252 agrees that: 
… there is certainly a case for arguing that a person who becomes a member of a 
guerrilla group, or armed faction that is involved in attacks against enemy armed 
forces, forfeits his protected status for so long as he participates in the activities of 
the group. 
As a consequence of these concerns, the general consensus at the expert discussion 
was that there was a legitimate and defensible253 need for a special legal regime 
applicable to organised armed groups who participated in hostilities in a more 
organised, structured and continuous manner, as compared with those civilians who 
participated only intermittently in hostilities, and who benefitted from the revolving 
door of civilian immunity. Rather than apply the revolving door of protection, which 
limits their protection from attack only for such time as they participate directly in 
hostilities, as is the case with civilians, this group of participants lose their civilian 
protection for the duration of their membership of the organised group - by virtue of 
their "continuous combat function".254 In other words, the "revolving door of 
protection starts to operate based on membership"255 in the organised group, and 
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the door revolves again, rendering the individual once again a protected civilian, but 
only once his or her membership of the group has ceased. The net effect of this 
regime for non-state actors, who like child soldiers and PMSCs are affiliated with 
organised armed groups, is that they stand to forfeit their immunity from direct 
targeting not only during their continuous combative acts but "even when they put 
down their weapons and walk home for lunch with their family".256 
While this approach does draw on notions of group membership, it is nevertheless 
different from the regime applicable to those who are members of the regular armed 
forces. For members of the state's armed forces, their status as combatants is 
determined by their formal membership of the armed group, regardless of the 
function the individual might perform, and until the individual leaves the force.257 As 
Melzer258 points out, any legal regime aimed at organised armed groups needs to 
take into consideration the: 
… more informal and fluctuating membership structures of irregularly constituted 
armed forces fighting on behalf of state and non-state belligerents.  
6.2 Activating the loss of protection based upon a "continuous combat 
function" 
The effect of this regime is that, once it is de facto evidenced that individual 
members of the organised armed group have functioned in a continuous combative 
matter, their membership results in their loss of civilian immunity against direct 
targeting for the duration of their membership.259 
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According to the ICRC Interpretive Guide: 
… membership in an organised armed group begins in the moment a civilian starts 
de facto to assume a continuous combat function for the group, and lasts until he 
or she ceases to assume such function.260  
Such an assessment requires proof of repeated direct participation in hostilities, 
along with a degree of integration into an armed group, with indications that: 
… such conduct constitutes a continuous function rather than a spontaneous, 
sporadic, or temporary role assumed for the duration of a particular operation.261 
There is no assessment based upon the donning of a uniform or the possession of 
an identification card - it is determined solely by function.262 
6.3 Exclusion and cessation of the "continuous combat function" 
classification 
At their core, these members of organised armed groups still enjoy primary civilian 
status (ie they do not acquire combatant status). As Melzer263 points out, "continuous 
combat function does not, of course, imply de jure entitlement to combatant 
privilege". Consequently, it is imperative that only those members of the group who 
actually engage in the continuous combat function stand to lose their otherwise 
civilian immunity from attack.264 Those who, while affiliated with an organised armed 
group, fail to participate directly in the hostilities, cannot be said to perform a 
continuous combat function, and consequently are excluded from the loss of 
protection on account of their failure to directly participate in hostilities.265 Moreover: 
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… once a member has affirmatively disengaged from a particular group, or has 
permanently changed from its military to its political wing, he regains his civilian 
immunity against attack.266  
The Interpretive Guide suggests that disassociation from the group "need not be 
openly declared", 267 but it might be manifested: 
… through conclusive behaviour, such as a lasting physical distancing from the 
group and reintegration into civilian life, or the permanent resumption of an 
exclusively non-combat function.268  
Consequently, the Guide favours a reasonable assessment as to whether an 
individual has disengaged from an organised armed group to be carried out in good 
faith on the basis of the presumption of civilian status in instances where doubt 
prevails.269 
6.4 A critique of the continuous combat function 
The ICRC's "continuous combat function" has not been without criticism. In 
particular, some academics have raised concerns around the issue that the specific 
treaty language, which the Interpretive Guide was attempting to interpret, states 
that civilians lose their immunity from attack for such time as they participate 
directly in hostilities.270 The ICRC's interpretation of the continuous combat function 
effectively arrives at a conclusion which makes it permissible to directly target 
civilians at all times, provided they are engaged in a continuous combat function.271 
The potential increased risk to civilians posed by the creation of the continuous 
combat function category has seen critics of the concept call for the "the other 
constituent parts of the guidance (ie the threshold of harm, direct causation and 
belligerent nexus criteria) not [to] be diluted"272 so as to adequately protect civilians 
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in times of armed conflict. Melzer - and others who defend the proposed continuous 
combat function category - cite principle XI273 in the ICRC's Interpretive Guide as 
providing the necessary counterbalance to prevent the continuous combat function 
category posing an increased risk to civilians, around whom there might be some 
doubt as to their degree of involvement in hostilities (ie as a sporadic direct 
participant or having a continuous combat function). 
Watkin is critical that the continuous combat function approach still gives rise to a 
tactical disadvantage for the state's armed forces, in that the regularly-constituted 
armed forces can target only those within the organised armed group who exhibit a 
continuous combat function, while their own non-combatant members can be 
targeted at all times.274 Watkin is skeptical that, at a split second's notice, a soldier 
can: 
… realistically be expected to distinguish between a civilian who participates on a 
"persistent recurring basis", and a member of an organised armed group who 
performs a "continuous combat function".275 
Fenrick concurs. In essence he argues that a smaller proportion of members of non-
state organised armed groups will find themselves liable to direct targeting, as 
compared to their counterparts employed by the state.276  
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Furthermore, protected immunity against attack is afforded to persons:  
… who are an integral part of the combat effectiveness of an organised armed 
group when their regular force counterparts performing exactly the same function 
can be targeted.277  
In response to these criticisms, Melzer278 points out that this perceived bias is not a 
fiction developed by the Interpretive Guide, but has its foundations in both treaty 
and customary IHL, which prohibits the direct targeting of civilians until such time as 
they participate directly in the hostilities. Melzer279 concedes that, while notionally 
more of the regular armed forces might be exposed to direct targeting than the 
members of their non-state counterparts, 
… the actual practical effect will have very little consequence, since in organised 
armed groups many of the so-called non-combative roles are performed by the very 
individuals who engage in the continuous combat function.280  
Moreover, as Melzer281 points out:  
… almost all non-combatant members of regular armed forces, with the exception 
of medical and religious personnel ... are not only entitled, but also trained, armed, 
and expected to directly participate in hostilities in case of enemy contact and, 
therefore, also assume a continuous combat function.282 
Another criticism raised by Watkin283 is that a restrictive interpretation of which 
activities amount to a combat function is at odds with interpretations adopted in 
legal writings. Watkin284 argues that the criteria for attaining membership in an 
organised armed group is couched so restrictively as to make the potential unlikely 
that an otherwise civilian may lose that status and thus be targetable. Watkin285 
prefers to apply the continuous loss of civilian immunity from attack: 
… not only to fighting personnel of organised armed groups, but essentially to any 
person who could be regarded as performing a "combat", "combat support", or 
                                        
277  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 664, 675; Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 837. 
278  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 852. 
279  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 851. 
280  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 852. 
281  For example, "cooks and administrative personnel" (Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 851). 
282  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 852. 
283  Watkin 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 683. 
284  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 835. 
285  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 913. 
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even "combat service support" function for such a group, including unarmed cooks 
and administrative personnel.  
Van der Toorn286 shares a similar concern, that the continuous participation 
requirement "imposes a very high threshold and would likely exclude a large number 
of individuals" who, for all intents and purposes, are "carrying out substantial and 
continuing integrated support functions for such groups", but "who fight for the 
group on a regular but not continuous basis".287 Van der Toorn288 suggests relaxing 
the strict continuous combat function requirement in favour of regular participation, 
or to require an individual's "primary function" to be direct participation in hostilities 
for the group.  
Watkin289 also suggests a similar formulation which would state that: 
… after the first involvement, any subsequent act demonstrating direct participation 
would start to provide the basis to believe that there is the beginning of a pattern 
of conduct that reflects an intention to regularly engage in the hostilities.  
So, for Watkin,290 repeated acts of participation can factor into one's determination of 
whether an individual's actions amount to continuous combat or not, and when such 
repetition has taken place "affirmative disengagement would be required in order to 
establish that such persons are no longer direct participants in hostilities". 
These criticisms certainly do give expression to legitimate concerns surrounding the 
ability of the state's armed forces to deal with an enemy which flouts the principle of 
distinction and whose actions at time might be perfidious and even in violation of 
IHL.291  
That being said, any interpretation which gives rise to overly permissive direct 
targeting of civilians will result in an unjustifiable level of arbitrary targeting of 
civilians.292 In response to this critique, Melzer293 cautions that what Watkin and Van 
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der Toorn refer to as combat support activities would in any event be considered 
integral to the hostile act, and consequently would result in the loss of immunity 
from attack. As Melzer294 explains, any civilian who participates directly in hostilities 
on a regular basis will very likely have some affiliation to an organised armed group 
and "thus, may be regarded as a de facto member assuming a continuous combat 
function for that force or group". According to Melzer295 this would apply to all 
participants from the armed full-time combatant to the private security contractors 
who are employed to defend military objectives, and also to the "farmer by day and 
fighter by night" who plants "IEDs, mines, or booby-traps, or provid[es] tactical 
intelligence or logistic support as part of specific attacks or combat operations".  
Moreover, Melzer296 argues that to adopt an over reaching notion of who could be 
targeted in an organised armed group to include any civilians who are merely 
accompanying or supporting an armed group (regardless of their specific function) 
would not respect the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" participation in 
hostilities, which is well established in both treaty and customary IHL.  
7  Presumptions in assessing direct participation in hostilities 
IHL operates on the presumption that in cases of doubt an individual will always be 
afforded the presumption of civilian status and is to enjoy immunity against direct 
targeting.297 It is a recognised principle of customary IHL that in instances of doubt, 
any targeting assessment must be able to show "sufficient indications to warrant an 
attack".298 Consequently, prior to and during any attack all reasonable precautions 
should be taken to ensure that the intended target of a planned attack is in fact a 
                                        
294  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 891. 
295  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 891. 
296  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 837. 
297  AP I art 50(1): "In case of doubt, the person must be presumed to be protected against direct 
attack". "One cannot automatically attack anyone who might appear dubious" (ICRC 2009 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-020609 74). 
298  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 74. 
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legitimate target. It must constitute a military objective and not be entitled to civilian 
immunity against direct targeting.299 
The rationale behind the principle of distinction and this legal presumption is to 
prevent civilians being targeted in error.300 The same rationale would make the 
presumption applicable in instances when an assessment needs to be made as to 
whether or not an individual has directly participated in hostilities. In the words of 
the ICRC's Interpretive Guide:  
 
... in case of doubt as to whether a specific civilian conduct qualifies as direct 
participation in hostilities, it must be presumed that the general rule of civilian 
protection applies and that this conduct does not.301  
7.1 Critique of the presumption's application to assessments of direct 
participation 
Schmitt302 rejects the ICRC's application of the presumption of civilian status to 
assessments of direct participation in favour of a presumption in favour of a finding 
of direct participation. Schmitt303 argues that once a determination is made that 
civilians are directly participating in hostilities, they may be legally targeted without 
further need to justify any resultant injury or death by considerations of 
proportionality or by taking special precautions in attack.304 Schmitt305 defends what 
he concedes may seem like a "counter-intuitive" approach on the grounds that it:  
… is likely to enhance the protection of the civilian population as a whole, because 
it creates an incentive for civilians to remain as distant from the conflict as possible. 
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Melzer306 cautions that instructing the armed forces that they are justified in directly 
targeting civilians whose actions are questionable is clearly contrary to the ethos of 
IHL and in violation of many of its fundamental provisions. As Melzer307 points out, it 
is not surprising, given the radical approach that Schmitt proposes, that there is no 
state practice or legal jurisprudence which supports this reverse presumption of 
civilian status. I prefer a more nuanced conclusion: that the proportionality and 
special precautions test would be easier to satisfy when doubts are raised regarding 
the degree of a civilian's involvement in hostilities. In other words, there is still an 
obligation to assess the proportionate result of the impending attack, as well as to 
take special precautions during the attack.308 The threshold for justifying these 
actions is easier to achieve when civilians are playing an active role in the hostilities. 
As Melzer309 correctly points out, if a civilian's actions threaten public law and order 
while not rising to the level of direct participation in hostilities, then these actions are 
to be dealt with in terms of civil law enforcement or the regime appropriate to self 
defence. 
8  The legal consequences for civilians found participating directly in 
hostilities 
It is also worth noting that at all times - even whilst participating directly in 
hostilities - civilians retain their primary civilian status. Their actions alone do not re-
classify them as combatants. They are, however, exposed to direct attack for so long 
as they persist with their direct participation in hostilities, despite their primary 
civilian status. While they lose their civilian immunity against direct attack, they 
never lose their inherently civilian status. Once they desist from their direct 
participation or disengage from the group's continuous combat function, they regain 
their full civilian immunity against direct attack. 
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Civilians, by definition, do not enjoy combatant status, with its attendant 
authorisation to participate directly in hostilities, associated POW status, and 
immunity from prosecution. Consequently, when civilians are found to be 
participating directly in hostilities without the requisite combatant privileges, they are 
exposed to the potential of criminal prosecution, even if during their participation 
they observed the laws of war regarding the means and methods of warfare.310 What 
is particularly problematic for civilians taking a direct part in hostilities or acting with 
a continuous combat function is that they very often ambush an adversary whilst 
failing to adequately distinguish themselves from the civilian population and feigning 
the right to civilian immunity against direct targeting.311 This is considered a serious 
violation of the IHL prohibition against perfidy.312  
9  Conclusion 
At present the ICRC's Interpretive Guide appears to provide a neutral, impartial and 
balanced interpretation of the longstanding IHL principle against civilian direct 
participation in hostilities. In setting a minimum threshold of harm, the Interpretive 
Guide respects the customary IHL distinction between mere general war effort and 
true direct participation in hostilities.313 In applying the direct causation requirement, 
the Interpretive Guide attempts to limit targeting decisions which may be overly 
broad, arbitrary and simply incorrect.314 The belligerent nexus link distinguishes 
occasions of legitimate military targeting from common criminal activities.  
As for the temporal scope of the loss of civilian immunity from attack, the revolving 
door phenomenon ensures maximum protection for the civilian population against 
arbitrary targeting decisions315 - in line with the fundamental principles of IHL. The 
concept of a "continuous combat function" distinguishes those "farmers by day and 
                                        
310  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 83, 84; Roberts 2009 YIHL 41; Melzer Targeted Killings 329. 
311  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 85. 
312  ICRC 2009 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-
020609 85. 
313  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 877. 
314  Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 867. 
315  Boothby 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 757. 
S BOSCH PER / PELJ 2014(17)3 
1040 
fighters by night" who participate directly in hostilities from those who merely 
provide indirect support for a belligerent party (and who retain their civilian 
immunity against attack). This concession, for critics like Schmitt,316 who feels that 
the "under-inclusivity" of the Guide does not adequately address the reality of 
contemporary armed conflict, allows 
… that organised armed groups belonging to non-state belligerents ... constitute 
legitimate military targets according to the same principles as regular combatants 
... for as long as they assume a continuous combat function,317 
and for the entire duration of their formal or functional membership.  
At all times it is evident that the Interpretive Guide adheres to the longstanding IHL 
principle of presumptive civilian status and immunity against direct attack in cases of 
doubt. The Interpretive Guide is also clear that, even while participating directly in 
hostilities, these civilian participants retain their primary civilian status - albeit 
without immunity against direct attack during their active and direct participation in 
hostilities. Their participation in hostilities does not render them authorised 
combatants, which is why they face criminal prosecution for their unauthorised 
participation in hostilities, in some instances on serious charges of perfidy. 
Nevertheless, the cessation of their participation in the hostilities restores their full 
civilian immunity against direct targeting. 
While there has been criticism directed at aspects of the Interpretive Guide, mostly 
on the grounds that it is under-inclusive, even those critics concede that "the three 
constitutive elements reflect factors that undoubtedly must play into such an 
analysis",318 and that the Interpretive Guide is: 
… superior to the various ad hoc lists because it provides those tasked with 
applying the norm on the battlefield with guidelines against which to gauge an 
action.319  
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All in all: 
… after careful consideration of the critiques prepared by Watkin, Schmitt, Boothby 
and Parks, nothing indicates that the ICRC's interpretive guidance is substantively 
inaccurate, unbalanced, or otherwise inappropriate, or that its recommendations 
cannot be realistically translated into operational practice.320  
More importantly, the Guide's cautious interpretation of direct participation in 
hostilities ensures that the fundamental principles of distinction and civilian immunity 
upon which all of IHL is built are observed.  
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